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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, ROGER E. HENDERSON, 





Docket No. 35138 
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court 
Bannock County, Idaho 
Honorable Ronald E. Bush, District Judge 
Norman G. Reece, Jr. 
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C. 
445 W. Chubbuck Rd., Ste. D 
Chubbuck, ID 83202 
Attorney for Appellant 
Ron Kerl, Esq. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
Attorney for Respondents 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents adopt the factual representations contained in Appellant's recitations set out at 
page 1 of the Appellant's Brief, however, contrary to the argument of Appellant, Respondents do not 
believe that the District Court erred in awarding them their attorney fees under the provisions of the 
Operating Agreement of Henderson Investment Properties, LLC ("HIP"). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondents adopt the representations contained in Appellant's recitations set out at pages 
2-3 of the Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents adoptthe factual representations contained in Appellant's recitations as set out 
at pages 3-6 of the Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the Respondents their attorney fees under 
the provisions of the Operating Agreement of Henderson Investment Properties, LLC? 
-1-
Findings of fact made by the trial court, which are necessaiy in the exercise of its discretion, 
are not to be set aside by this Court absent a showing that the facts found by the trial court were not 
support by substantial and competent evidence. "A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside only 
if clearly erroneous, which means that they were not supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
(citation omitted)." Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253,255 (Idaho 2008). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN A WARDING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES 
1. DISSOLUTION COMPLAINT 
The trial court determined that the Respondents were entitled to their attorney fees under the 
terms of the HIP Operating Agreement. Article XIV(G) of the Operating Agreement provides: 
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this agreement, or 
where any provision is asserted as a defense, the successful party is entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any other remedy. R.p.114. 
Appellants do not contend that (1) Respondents were not the prevailing parties in the litigation 
below, or (2) the trial court did not consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) or 
any other appropriate factor. Lee v. Nickerson, supra at 189 P.3d 467, 472-473 (Idaho 2008). Nor 
has Appellant claimed that the amount of the attorney fees awarded was unreasonable. 
Instead, Appellant claims that the trial court did not exercise reason in deciding to award the 
Respondents their attorney fees. See, Appellant's Brief, p. 9, wherein it is argued: 
-3-
statutory provision intended to specifically bring an end to an entity that would not 
exist but for the contract between the parties. Rather, Ralph sought to enforce a 
variety of Operating Agreement provisions, for the purpose of obtaining dissolution 
of the business entity, and he was unsuccessful in that pursuit." R. pp. 177-178. 
One specific term of the IDP Operating Agreement was heavily relied upon by Appellant. That term 
is contained in Article XIV(B). That paragraph reads: 
B. Specific Performance. The parties to this Agreement agree that irreparable 
damage would occur if any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed 
in accordance with its specific terms or were otherwise breached. The parties agree 
that they are entitled to injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this 
Agreement and to specifically enforce the terms and provisions in any United States 
comi or any state having jurisdiction, in addition to any other remedy to which they 
are entitled at law or in equity. 
In order to succeed in his request for judicial dissolution under either Idaho Code §53-643(1 )(a) or 
§53-643(l)(b), Appellant had to prove - in addition to other things - that irreparable injury to filP 
was being suffered or was being threatened. 
The trial court found that IDP had not been threatened by or suffered any irreparable injury. 
R. pp 141, 150-151. A review of the record shows that Appellant did not introduce evidence of 
irreparable injury- real or tl1reatened. Rather, Appellant solely relied upon Article XIV(B) offue 
Operating Agreement. Appellant argued that ifhe proved violations of the Operating Agreement 
on fue part of the Respondents, those violations, when applied with the provisions of Article XIV(B) 
supplied the needed element of irreparable injury and would force a judicial dissolution of HIP. 
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Article XIV(G) of the Operating Agreement provides that "In any action or proceeding 
brought to enforce any provision of this agreement, or where any provision is asserted as a defense, 
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any other remedy. 
R.p.114." Since Appellant tried to enforce many different provisions of the Operating Agreement -
and failed - Respondents are entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to the parties contract. 
2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMPLAINT 
In urging this Court to disallow the trial court's attorney fee award, Appellant argues that the 
relief sought in the Appellant's Declaratory Judgment action was also unrelated, in its entirety, to 
the HIP Operating Agreement. Appellant's Declaratory Judgment Complaint is set out in the record 
at R. pp 48-70. This action was dismissed, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 
The Appellant has made no claim that (1) Respondents were not the prevailing parties in the 
litigation below, or (2) the trial court did not consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(3) or any other appropriate factor in awarding Respondents their attorney fees. Lee v. 
Nickerson, supra at 189 P.3d 467, 472-473 (Idaho 2008). Nor has Appellant claimed that the 
amount of fees awarded by the trial court were unreasonable. 
The general thesis of Appellant's Declaratory Judgment Complaint was that since he had 
brought the Dissolution Complaint against Roger and Lisa on July 27, 2005, and the dissolution 
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existence of the dissolution complaint (and the allegations contained therein) the Appellant could 
not invoke Idaho Code §53-641(1)(e) to disassociate the Respondents. 
The trial court found Appellant's theory in the Declaratory Judgment Action to be specious 
and declined to use Idaho Code §53-64l(l)(e) in the manner sought by Appellant. 
It would allow a means of accomplishing the same without truly offering an 
opportunity for full and fair consideration of the basis for such disassociation. It 
would allow an opportunity for someone who might have a personal vendetta or be 
otherwise disgruntled against other members of the Limited Liability Company Act 
(sic) to lay in wait and utilize such a provision in a manner that the Court would find 
to be inconsistent with an interpretation of Idaho law that is intended to achieve 
justice. 
Now, I would define justice in the setting to be consistent with due process, which 
is to have fair opportunity to respond and defend and have matters decided on the 
merits. 
So for those reasons, Counsel, the Court will grant defendants' Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion 
to dismiss the complaint. ... 
The trial court found that the legal issues in the Declaratory Judgment Complaint were 
essentially the same as those brought in the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, and for the same 
reasons given in the first instance, fees were awarded to the Respondents for their successful defense 
of the second lawsuit. R. p.184. That finding of fact is not clearly erroneous and should not be set 
aside by this Court. Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253, 255 (Idaho 2008). 
The trial court did not ignore the context in which the declaratory judgment complaint was 
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1338 (1994). Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 143 (Idaho 1996). The Operating Agreement provides 
the 'contractual right' necessary to award Respondents their attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has not established that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous 
nor has he established that the trial court's award of attorney fees to the Respondents was an abuse 
of its discretion. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
T 
Respectfully submitted this /tJ day of December, 2008. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on the /,t} day of December, 2008, I served two (2) trne and correct 
copies of the foregoing document as follows: 
Norman G. Reece, Jr. 
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C. 
445 W. Chubbuck Rd., Ste. D 
Chubbuck, ID 83202 
[xx] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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Ron Kerl, of the firm 
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